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Abstract: Territorial rights are important for the Sámi people, as they are for 
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sources are articulated and recognized. These rights are based on old doctrines: 
“immemorial usage” in Norway and “immemorial prescription” in Sweden and 
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Court here based their reasoning on customary law (sedvanerätt) with regard to reindeer 
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1 Introduction
Sámi2 rights to land – rights to own or to use land and natural resources – are 
crucial. Land represents the material and spiritual foundation of Sámi cultural 
identity, and provides the basic necessities for traditional activities like reindeer 
husbandry. Such rights are often referred to as territorial rights.3 Seen as a whole, 
the three Nordic States – Norway, Sweden and Finland – have until very recently 
recognized such Sámi territorial rights only as usufruct rights.4 Developments in 
Norwegian law, through case law and legislation, have meant a breakthrough in 
this respect. Nevertheless, to various degrees and manners, the three countries 
still struggle with the recognition of limited Sámi rights, chiefly the recognition 
(and protection) of the reindeer herding right.
As to ownership, the States implicitly or explicitly claim ownership of Sápmi,5 
the vast cross-border territory that constitutes the customary Sámi home area.6 
For Norway this picture must be somewhat modified given a shift in attitude re-
lated to certain areas, particularly in the very north of the country.7 Concerning 
an area called Svartskogen in northern Norway, the Norwegian Supreme Court 
found in 2001 that the local population (of Sámi majority), not the State, were the 
rightful owners.8 Additionally, a new statute has transferred a majority of “state-
owned” lands in the very north in Finnmark, regarded as the core Sámi area, to a 
new body (the Finnmark Estate) to manage these lands.9 Importantly this statute 
husbandry on so called winter-pasture areas. (Compare with my case review in this issue of 
the Arctic Review on Law and Politics.) This article should therefore be read with the verdict 
of the Nordmaling case in mind, i.e. the analysis of Swedish law concerning the recognition 
of reindeer herding rights for winter-pastures is no longer relevant. In Swedish reindeer hus-
bandry legislation there is a distinction made between year-around-areas and winter-pasture 
areas. For year-around-areas immemorial prescription still applies. 
2. Also spelled Saami or Sami. The Sámi were formerly known as Laps.
3. See e.g. J. Anaya, Indigenous peoples in international law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) p. 143.
4. See also the report of the UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya, The situation of the Sami 
peoples in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland, A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y, 2011 at 
46–52.
5. See e.g. N. Bankes, Legal Systems in Arctic Human Development Report (Stefanson Arctic 
Institute, Akureyri, 2004) pp. 112–113. The issue of State ownership is in general contested 
among the Sámi.
6. For a map, see www.eng.samer.se/servlet/GetDoc?meta_id=1002 (accessed March 1, 2011).
7. This shift must be understood broadly. For instance, the Norwegian State has nowadays in 
various public documents recognized that the country is founded on the territory of two 
peoples: the Norwegian and the Sámi, thereby recognizing the country’s colonial history.
8. Rt. 2001 s. 1229.
9. Finnmark Act, June 17, 2005 No. 85.
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also laid down processes for examining the rights of the Sámi and other locals to 
the Finnmark Estate lands, meaning that still existing Sámi rights, ownership or 
limited rights, are being investigated by a specific commission.10
With respect to territorial rights, it is essential to recall that the Sámi were al-
ready living on the lands when the present State boundaries were established and 
cut across Sápmi.11 Those borders are still somewhat problematic, in particular 
for reindeer husbandry. Along with many other indigenous populations residing 
in Western societies, the Sámi have long struggled to have their territorial rights 
recognized, and above all, their ownership rights.
This article focuses on the three counties’ proprietary regimes and Sámi tra-
ditional land uses, and more precisely the legal doctrines of “immemorial us-
age” (Norway) and “immemorial prescription” (Sweden/Finland). It addresses 
and analyses the legal foundation of territorial rights of the Sámi in the three 
countries in a comparative manner. The aim is to contrast and discuss the general 
principles underpinning the recognition of such rights and to point to differences 
among the three countries, especially as the Sámi are one people in and among the 
three countries. While covering three countries’ laws, the article mainly provides a 
condensed analysis and discussion on the matter. Naturally not all complex facets 
and details can be addressed. Moreover, attention focuses on reindeer husbandry 
since it has, to larger extent than other traditional activities, been acknowledged 
to establish usufruct rights to land.
It should be observed that the comparative analysis here is at a national level, 
since the recognition of Sámi rights is mainly rooted within the Nordic State’s 
property laws.12 Up until today a substantive review of Sámi (or other indigenous 
10. Such rights may be based upon prescription, immemorial usage or other proprietary con-
cepts. This is a work currently in progress. A specific court will eventually resolve disputes 
over those rights. See the Finnmark Act s. 5. For a good analysis of certain issues related to 
the acknowledgement of rights adhering to Finnmark, see Ravna, 'Alders tids bruk og hevd 
som ervervsgrunnlag i samiske områder – særlig med vekt på kravet til aktsom god tro ved 
rettsidentifieringen i Finnmark', Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 3/2010. A government com-
mission has suggested a similar regime for Nordland and Troms Counties, the area south of 
Finnmark. See NOU 2007:13 pp. 31–35, 1169.
11. Compare with the definition in Article 1.1(b) of the ILO Convention No. 169 concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.
12. Until quite recently land rights have rarely been addressed from an international human 
rights perspective, given that the property law regimes traditionally remain in the domain 
of the States’ national jurisdiction. The view that States exercise territorial sovereignty is 
still strong, even if legislative and jurisprudential evolution occurs on different levels, in 
particular regarding indigenous peoples. See J. Gilbert, Indigenous peoples' land rights under 
international law. From victims to actors (Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, N.Y. 2006) pp. 
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people’s) land rights, challenging the domestic laws, has not seen its light at the 
European Court of Human Rights. Following Timo Koivurova, “indigenous peo-
ples have not found much protection from the European Court (or Commission) 
of Human Rights.” 13 For the few cases that have made their way to the European 
Commission or Court, it is clear that the domestic court proceedings are to de-
termine the existence and extent of indigenous people’s territorial rights.14 This 
should be contrasted against the evolutionary case law in the Inter-American hu-
man rights system.15
In relation to the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, only Norway is party to the Convention.16 
Article 14 of the Convention, the essential land rights provision, more or less pre-
supposes that the recognition of territorial rights is to be done according to na-
tional law.17
Consequently the analysis in this article is based on national laws, chiefly the 
two doctrines. It is common to assume, without deeper examination, that imme-
87, 114–115. See also A. Xanthaki, “Indigenous rights in international law over the last 10 
years and future developments’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 1/2009 p. 5, where 
the author expresses that “land issues represent a grey area in international law, as the right 
to property has not acquired as strong protection as have other rights.”
13. T. Koivurova, “Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous 
Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
18/2011, p. 28.
14. Ibid., p. 26. The cases have either been deemed inadmissible or the protection awarded has 
been scanty. See e.g. Handölsdalen Sami village and Others v. Sweden, Appl. no. 39013/04, 
Judgement March 30, 2010. Here the Court only found a violation of Article 6.1 in regard to 
the length of the proceedings. 
The cases from the UN Human Rights Committee on Article 27 (protection of culture) do 
not address the conditions for territorial rights. See e.g. J. Länsman et al v. Finland Comm. No. 
1023/2001, adopted April 15, 2005. Compare with the UN Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No. 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5.
15. See e.g. the landmark case of Awas Tingni: Mayagana (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgement of 31 August 2001 (Series C 
No. 79). Here the communal property of Awas Tingni was upheld by the Court despite the 
lack of State recognition, and hence it was a violation of the right to property. In subsequent 
matters the Inter-American Human Rights institutions have confirmed the ruling in the Awas 
Tingni case.
16. The only binding instruments that recognize indigenous peoples’ territorial rights remain 
the two ILO treaties, including the ILO Convention No. 107 from 1959.
17. This is also the view of the Norwegian Sámi Rights Committee which recently analysed the 
matter. See NOU 2007:13 pp. 231, 233. Hence, national property law applies and, in addition, 
indigenous customs and land tenure systems should be considered. Compare with Articles 
8(1), 13(1) and 34.
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morial usage and immemorial prescription are equivalent.18 With close analysis 
differences do emerge. The article argues that despite superficial resemblance, 
rather indistinct differences may work in advance for the recognition of Sámi ter-
ritorial rights in Norwegian law in contrast to the situation in Sweden and Finland, 
and may help explain the disparity in recognition of Sámi territorial rights that 
we see today.
2 Reindeer husbandry
2.1 Some basic information
Reindeer husbandry is a traditional Sámi industry, today carried out only by a 
minority of roughly ten percent of all Sámi.19 Of course there are other revenue-
producing traditional Sámi activities, such as fishing (in coastal areas, lakes and 
rivers) and handicrafts, but these have generally been overlooked by the States 
when it comes to acknowledgement and codification.20
In Norway, Sweden and Finland, reindeer husbandry is carried out on both 
state-owned and privately-owned lands, a situation that is explicitly mentioned 
only in Finnish legislation.21 The right to herd reindeer is generally characterized 
as a usufruct right that burdens the title to the land. The table below provides some 
basic figures for the three countries.
18. See e.g. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 59; SOU 2006:14 p. 464; NOU 2007:13 p. 247.
19. Most Sámi live in Norway, some 50,000–65,000, while the official figure in Sweden is some 
20,000. There are approximately 8,000 Sámi in Finland and estimated up to 2,000 in Russia. 
See Nordisk samekonvensjon: utkast fra finsk-norsk-svensk-samisk ekspertgruppe (2005) p. 
106. However, the figures are approximate and no official census has been done recently.
20. In Norway a government commission has investigated Sámi coastal fishing rights. See NOU 
2008:5.
21. Finnish Reindeer Husbandry Act, s. 3.
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Table l. Comparison of reindeer husbandry in Norway, Sweden and Finland
Size of the rein­
deer herding 
area (% of State 
 territory)
Organisation 
form
Basic statute and its is­
sue date
Sámi mono­
poly of rein­
deer hus­
bandry
Norway1 About 40% 80 reindeer 
herding dis-
tricts2 
Reindeer Husbandry 
Act, 20073 
Yes
Sweden4 About 40% 51 Sámi villages Reindeer Husbandry 
Act, 19715 
Yes
Finland6 About 35% 57 reindeer 
herding co-
operatives
Reindeer Husbandry 
Act, 19907 
No
1 See www.reindrift.no/?id=300&subid=0 (accessed March 1, 2011).
2 The exact number may vary from year to year, but the number in recent years has been fairly 
constant, around 80 districts, NOU 2007:13 p. 380.
3 Reindeer Husbandry Act, June 15, 2007 No. 40 (Norwegian RHA).
4 Svensk rennäring (Statistiska centralbyrån, Stockholm, 1999) pp. 15, 123.
5 Reindeer Husbandry Act (1971:437) (Swedish RHA).
6 See www.paliskunnat.fi/default2.aspx?kieli=en-US (accessed March 1, 2011).
7 Reindeer Husbandry Act 14.9.1990/848 (Finnish RHA).
From the data it is obvious that reindeer husbandry is carried out over vast areas 
in all three countries: in Norway and Sweden on some 40% of their respective 
territory, and in Finland somewhat less. Reindeer husbandry is concentrated in 
the northern and mid parts of each country, meaning that the majority of these 
particular areas are subject to reindeer husbandry. In these same areas other ac-
tivities are also carried out, such as forestry, agriculture, mining and tourism. It is 
not difficult to grasp that multiple stakeholders compete to use the land and natu-
ral resources simultaneously within these areas.22 Also, outdoor activities related 
to public access to lands (e.g. snow scooter driving, hiking, hunting and fishing) 
sometimes interfere with reindeer husbandry.23 In addition, the exact boundaries 
of reindeer herding areas remain largely undefined, in particular in Sweden,24 
which further compounds the problems outlined above.
22. See also the UN report, supra note 4, at 55–61.
23. Snow scooter driving is not part of the rights in “the public access to land’, but it is often a 
prerequisite for travel to remote hunting areas. This problem is more accentuated in Sweden 
and Finland, while Norwegian legislation is more restrictive.
24. There has been a government commission investigating the matter, which concluded that 
most of northern Sweden is pasture areas. So far, this has not led to any government action. 
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Specific administrative organizations (the reindeer herding district, the Sámi 
village, and reindeer herding cooperative) are tasked to manage reindeer hus-
bandry over a geographically-defined area.25 Although the structures for reindeer 
husbandry are operated differently in the three countries, there are a few basic 
similarities. Another common denominator is that the organisations have the 
authority to act as representatives and have an important function for managing 
reindeer husbandry. Moreover, reindeer husbandry may be performed only though 
these prescribed bodies, and membership is mandatory.26
As indicated in table 1 above, Norway has amended its legislation relatively 
recently, whereas Sweden has not been able to arrive at an acceptable solution 
despite several government reports and drafts.27 Finnish legislation differs in one 
major aspect from the Norwegian and Swedish situation. Reindeer husbandry 
is not an industry exclusive to the Sámi in Finland, where Finnish settlers and 
farmers began quite early to herd reindeer. As a result, anyone permanently living 
within the Finnish reindeer herding area, and who is a citizen of a country within 
the European Economic Area, has the right to own and herd reindeer.28 This is an 
important distinction between Norway and Sweden on the one hand, and Finland 
on the other, and impacts legislation concerning reindeer husbandry as well as 
reindeer herding rights, as discussed next in relation to Finnish law.
2.2 The reindeer herding right
The Sámi reindeer herding right is understood as a civil right in all three countries, 
even if this is not stated in the Finnish statute.29 In Norway and Sweden, the rein-
deer herding right consists of a bundle of different rights stated in the Acts.30 The 
most basic is the right to use the lands for pasture. The right includes, among other 
things, a right to move reindeer between different pastures, a right to construct 
buildings and structures necessary for reindeer husbandry such as cots, store-
houses and fences, and a right to take timber for such buildings and structures, as 
See SOU 2006:14.
25. In the Finnish legislation, the term “reindeer herding cooperative” means only the adminis-
trative organisation and not the area as such. See RP 244/1989 p. 7. This is, however, doubtful.
26. Norwegian RHA, ss. 5–6; the Swedish RHA, ss. 6 and 1 para. 3; and RP 244/1989 p. 7.
27. SOU 2001:101; Ds 2009:40. However, some decision-making authority was transferred from 
the State to the Sámi Parliament, Prop. 2005/06:86.
28. Finnish RHA, ss. 1, 2 and 4. There are some conditions for the ownership, see ss. 6 and 9–10.
29. Norwegian RHA, s. 4 para. 1; Swedish RHA, s. 1 para. 2. The reference to immemorial usage 
and immemorial prescription respectively, means that this is the reindeer herding right’s 
primary legal basis – and not the statute itself. On Finnish law see section 3.4.
30. Norwegian RHA, ss. 19–26; Swedish RHA, ss. 15–25.
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well as hunting, trapping and fishing rights. The provisions concerning reindeer 
herding rights are detailed and can best be understood as a codification of older 
rights. In fact very little has been changed since the first legislative enactments, 
and the present Norwegian and Swedish provisions are similar in this respect.
3 The recognition of territorial rights
3.1 Introduction
During most of the 1900s, Norway, Sweden and Finland assumed that the Sámi 
semi-nomadic and wide-ranging use of land did not qualify for establishing rights 
to land and resources. To some extent this assumption still prevails, especially 
concerning Sámi land ownership, where cultivation of land has since long formed 
the standard. Recently a major turning point came in Norway with the Selbu and 
Svartskogen cases in 2001.31 The Swedish Nordmaling case (court of appeal) in 
2007 was the first case to uphold reindeer herding rights on private lands.32 Finland 
is so far lacking case law on these matters.
Apart from historical case law, cases on Sámi rights started to emerge, in prin-
ciple, after the Second World War. Sámi territorial rights have been and are articu-
lated chiefly in accordance with two old proprietary law doctrines: immemorial 
usage (alders tids bruk) in Norway, and immemorial prescription (urminnes hävd) 
in Sweden and Finland. To some extent occupation and/or (normal) prescription 
are being discussed in relation to Sámi land rights, at least in the legal literature.33 
Space does not permit discussion of these aspects here, but the law today essen-
tially evolves around these two doctrines. In Norway, the country leading this 
31. Rt. 2001 s. 769; Rt. 2001 s. 1229. Two older cases which have been fundamental for the recogni-
tion of Sámi territorial rights in Norway should also be mentioned here: the Altevann case (Rt. 
1968 s. 429) and the Brekken case (Rt. 1968 s. 394). The first case acknowledged a protection 
(compensation for infringements) of customary and long-term usage by (Swedish!) reindeer 
herders. The latter case concerned hunting, fishing and trapping rights for reindeer herders, 
and the Supreme Court upheld these rights on the basis of prolonged usage. Subsequent cases 
demonstrate a more wobbly path, see section 3.2.2 below.
32. Hovrätten för övre Norrland, 2007–09–19, T 155–06. The case is now pending at the Supreme 
Court.
33. See e.g. G. K. Eriksen, Alders tids bruk (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, 2008) pp. 43, 186; S. F. 
Skogvang, Samerett. (2 ed., Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 2009) pp. 232–233; Bengtsson, Samerätt 
(Norstedts juridik, Stockholm, 2004) p. 82; C. Allard, Two sides of the coin – rights and duties 
(Luleå tekniska universitet, Luleå 2006) pp. 285–288. On historical rights with transnational 
relevance see e.g. K. Korpijaakko-Labba, Om samernas rättsliga ställning i Sverige-Finland 
(Juristförbundets förlag, Helsingfors 1994); O. Jebens, Om eiendomsretten til grunnen i Indre 
Finnmark (Cappelen akademisk forlag, Oslo 1999).
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jurisprudential development, it has been natural to assert both prescription and 
immemorial usage before the courts, but for the most part and with specific rea-
sons, the courts have articulated their reasoning under the doctrine of immemo-
rial usage (see next section).
With immemorial usage and immemorial prescription, a certain set of condi-
tions apply. Apart from long-term use of a certain area, as a general condition the 
land use must have been sufficiently intensive, continuous and exclusive to succeed 
into a right.34 This is similar for both doctrines. A common and essential thread 
is that the two doctrines were developed for more stationary land uses adapted to 
the needs of farming society.35 For this reason one must take into account specific 
Sámi land use traditions and views when applying conditions inherent in the two 
doctrines, something explicitly done only by the Supreme Court in Norway.
3.2 Immemorial usage in Norwegian law
3.2.1 The doctrine of immemorial usage
In this section the doctrine’s main features and characteristics will be examined 
on the basis of legal literature. While immemorial usage shows similarities with 
prescriptive rules, the doctrine will be contrasted against prescription. This rela-
tionship is relevant for understanding immemorial prescription in Swedish and 
Finnish law. In the two following sections the application of immemorial usage is 
illustrated with the leading Selbu and Svartskogen cases.
Immemorial usage has been said to contain a certain patina, through its age 
more than distinctiveness, meaning its conditions are somewhat vague.36 It is an 
old proprietary doctrine which provides that one can establish ownership or lesser 
rights based upon use over time.37 In contrast to Sweden and Finland, immemo-
rial usage has maintained a strong position in Norwegian law, and both old and 
new case law are proof of that. The doctrine is not only applied in relation to Sámi 
territorial rights, and its continued usage also explains why it has been and still 
is discussed in legal literature.38 Gunnar Eriksen has concluded that because of 
the doctrine’s flexibility and relative content, it has proved itself as a vigorous and 
practical part of Norwegian property law.39
34. Compare e.g. Skogvang, op.cit., p. 234.
35. Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 271–272; Eriksen, op. cit., p. 348.
36. S. Brækhus and A. Hærem, Norsk tingsrett (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo 1964) p. 604.
37. T. Falkanger and A. T. Falkanger, Tingsrett (Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, 2007) p. 324.
38. Gunnar Eriksen defended a doctoral thesis on immemorial usage in 2008: Eriksen, op. cit. For 
references to other legal literature see Falkanger and Falkanger, op. cit., p. 323 and Brækhus 
and Hærem, op. cit., p. 605.
39. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 369.
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Rights established by immemorial usage can be explained in brief as a certain 
use over a long time period that has occurred in good faith.40 These three main con-
ditions were developed long ago chiefly through case law and recently reiterated 
by the Selbu and Svartskogen cases.41 Since immemorial prescription is not codi-
fied in legislation, these conditions form a part of unwritten law. The conditions 
inherent in immemorial prescription are somewhat vague, both due to its unwrit-
ten character and because immemorial usage has historically been influenced by 
the rules on prescription. Therefore it is not possible to draw a clear line between 
immemorial usage and prescriptive rights.
Prescriptive rules have been part of written law since the medieval codes, and 
from the 19th century onwards the kinship between immemorial usage and pre-
scription has been accentuated.42 The present legislation on prescription is from 
1966 and includes “ownership prescription” with a prescriptive time period of 
20 years and “usufruct prescription” with a time-frame of 50 years.43 The latter 
prescription allows for communal uses over a long time (50 years) as a mean for 
establishing limited rights, for example by local peoples in rural communities.44
The relatedness between prescriptive rights and immemorial usage is also il-
lustrated by the fact that immemorial usage has been used as a subsidiary claim 
when the rules on prescription did not succeed, typically when the land use had 
not been sufficiently comprehensive and continuous.45 So what are the main dif-
ferences? Most obvious is the time period, which is much longer for immemorial 
usage. Compare here with the three main conditions for immemorial usage stated 
above in italics. A fixed time-frame for immemorial usage has not been set au-
thoritatively, but must be substantively longer than 20 years.46 As the concept itself 
suggests, the usage must be immemorial, or in other words olden. In literature and 
case law the time span varies from some 50 years to 150, but as a rule of thumb the 
time period should be about 100 years total.47 A lower threshold for immemorial 
usage must today be set to 50 years because of the statutory “usufruct prescription.’
40. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 610.
41. Rt. 2001 s. 769 at pp. 788–789; Rt. 2001 s. 1229 at p. 1241.
42. Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 96, 370–371. 
43. Act on Prescription, December 9, 1966 No. 1 ss. 2 and 8.
44. “Usufruct prescription” has not meant a decline in claims on immemorial usage, as supposed 
by the legislator.
45. Falkanger and Falkanger, op. cit., p. 324.
46. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 611.
47. Ibid.; Falkanger and Falkanger, op. cit., p. 325; Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 186–188. It is mainly in a 
few old cases where the Supreme Court has accepted around 50 years, probably under influ-
ence of Danish law, see Eriksen, op. cit., p. 191.
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Another difference is related to the land use. For immemorial usage the same 
requirement is not imposed upon a visible land use, such as through cultivation 
or the need to erect structures as proof of a particular on-going land usage. But 
nevertheless the land use must be of such character that the rightful owner realises 
the need to intervene.48 This is also important for the condition of occurring in 
good faith (see further below).
The intensity of use is more lenient for immemorial usage, principally allowed 
because of the longer time span. Eriksen has concluded that the intensity of the 
land use is “the most dynamic element in the rules on immemorial usage.”49 As a 
synopsis, the intensity criterion is assessed with all facts taken together, but most 
central is that the use as such corresponds with a “normal” use of the area in ques-
tion and with the rights claimed.50 For example, if ownership is claimed, the use 
must have been all-embracing compared to how the area could have been utilised. 
It should also be mentioned that if the intensity criterion is met, the same kind of 
use must not have been performed over the whole time period, but rather that the 
use for each period correspond to the best and most natural usage.51 A related is-
sue is the use of large areas, typically for reindeer herding, where the intensity of 
the use is satisfied in some parts of the area but not in others. This was addressed 
by the Supreme Court in the Selbu case (see below).
The use must also have been sufficiently continuous, which is a requirement 
supplementary to the intensity criterion.52 Here the difference in time-frame for 
prescription in respect to immemorial usage again becomes relevant, because 
“ownership prescription” lapses lasting over two years mean that the prescription 
is broken.53 The time period for allowed interruptions in land use for immemorial 
usage is flexible. Discontinuity in the use due to natural causes, such a seasonal 
fluctuation, weather conditions, logging in an area, etc., is generally accepted. 
Personal causes may also be accepted where relevant, for instance a man has not 
been able to log due to a period of sickness. As a general rule, where land use has 
been less intensive, only minor disruptions in the use can be accepted.54
When it comes to the criterion on exclusive authority over the area in ques-
tion, it is not equally straightforward to say that requirements are more lenient 
48. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 612; Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 136–137; Falkanger and Falkanger, 
op. cit., p. 325.
49. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 146.
50. Ibid., p. 141.
51. Ibid., p. 149.
52. Ibid., p. 147.
53. Act on Prescription s. 6.
54. Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 147–148.
christina allard
170
for immemorial usage than prescription. For claims on ownership or limited but 
exclusive rights, this criterion is essential.55 This means that the user of the land 
must have hindered or obstructed others’ use, including any use by the rightful 
owner. There are examples in case law of both a more lenient application of the 
exclusivity criterion for immemorial usage, as well as applications along the stand-
ards for prescription.56 According to Eriksen it seems natural to start with the 
presumption that the criterion is somewhat less for immemorial usage, given the 
duration of land use required and potential risk of competing land uses at some 
time during this period, and that the conditions for immemorial usage in unison 
are flexible and relative.57
Lastly, we have the condition of good faith. This condition is mainly understood 
as being in line with the public’s sense of justice: a certain usage of a piece of land 
should not continue when it is known to be unlawful.58 This condition applies 
equally for immemorial usage and for prescription, but was historically not a part 
of the rules.59 Following Eriksen, the good faith requirement has less relevance for 
long-term usage which began in “dusky history” than to usage of known onset. 
The good faith criterion may well be illusionary when information about the actual 
use and what past users knew or ought to have known is scarce or non-existant. 
He argues that in such cases more emphasis should be put on documentation of 
the actual and continuous land use from the earliest time.60 For collective usage of 
land it is clear that the threshold for good faith is lower than for prescription: if a 
few of the users are not in good faith it lacks relevance.61 This view was applied in 
the Selbu and Svartskogen cases, both of which concerned communal use.
Accordingly in many ways the conditions for establishing rights based on im-
memorial usage are more lenient than corresponding conditions for prescription. 
The similarity between the two sets of rules is nevertheless evident. However, there 
are a few aspects that are distinct to immemorial usage. First and foremost the 
conditions for immemorial usage are internally relative and allow a free assessment 
55. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., pp. 581, 612.
56. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 153.
57. Ibid., pp. 152, 155.
58. Falkanger and Falkanger, op. cit., p. 326; Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 219–220.
59. Under the influence of Roman law and Danish-Norwegian theory, in a case from 1844 the 
Supreme Court did not uphold a claim on ownership prescription because the good faith was 
not there. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 584. See further on this development in Eriksen, 
op. cit., pp. 204–219.
60. Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 225, 226. Øyvind Ravna has also argued for a more lenient application of 
the the good faith criterion, or even its omission, as related to claims on the Finnmark Estate. 
See Ravna (2010), supra note 10, pp. 500–501.
61. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 612; Falkanger and Falkanger, op. cit., p. 326.
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of all facts taken together.62 The court has therefore a large margin of apprecia-
tion. For instance, less intense land usage may be compensated by a longer period 
of use, and vice versa. This cannot be seen in relation to the Norwegian rules on 
prescription. A court may additionally pay regard to other factors, such as how 
awkward the land use is for the property owner or how necessary the use is for the 
ones claiming immemorial usage.63
Secondly, because immemorial usage is an unwritten doctrine, the conditions 
are easier to adapt to given circumstances, which follows from its internally relative 
conditions. The point here is that this balancing of facts and eventual adjustments 
do not involve the legislator, but are principally driven by judges.
3.2.2 The Selbu case – the reindeer herding right
The Selbu case,64 which concerns reindeer husbandry, has become instrumental for 
clarifying the establishment of reindeer herding rights through immemorial usage. 
In fact, along with the Svartskogen case, it has been seen to represent a paradigm 
shift, and the two cases have revitalised the doctrine.65 The importance of the Selbu 
case must be understood with a glimpse in the rear-view mirror. In particular, 
three earlier cases have proved that the threshold for establishing reindeer herd-
ing rights were high.66 Herding use was not regarded as sufficiently intensive and 
continuous, and when the Selbu case was decided in plenum by a total of fifteen 
judges, the Supreme Court set aside these previous cases. One of the most crea-
tive aspects of the verdict was the emphasis on the particular features of reindeer 
husbandry and its importance, for balancing of the conditions.67
Furthermore, as evidenced by the verdict, the case was decided merely on the 
basis of national law, despite the fact that relevant international law provisions 
were invoked. The Court deemed the Norwegian provisions on immemorial usage 
to be sufficient for the assessment of the existence of reindeer herding rights.68 Of 
importance in the case was also the burden of proof. Present legislation imposes 
the onus of proof upon the property owners as long as the claim regards pasture 
62. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 132; Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 611.
63. Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., p. 611.
64. Rt. 2001 s. 769. The decision was rendered in a vote of 9 against 6. Hereunder I refer to the 
majority’s reasoning. The dissenting judges agreed on the basic principles but had another 
opinion regarding the boundary for the right.
65. Eriksen, op. cit., p. 324, 363.
66. Rt. 1981 s. 1215; Rt. 1988 s. 1217; Rt. 1997 s. 1608. See also Ø. Ravna, Rettsutgreiing og bruk-
sordning i reindriftsområder (Gyldendal akademisk, Oslo 2008) pp. 229–233.
67. See e.g. Ravna, op. cit., p. 239. For a summary of earlier cases related to Sámi, see e.g. Eriksen 
op. cit., pp. 315–324; NOU 2007:13 pp. 309–311.
68. Rt. 2001 s. 769 at pp. 791, 818.
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areas within the Norwegian reindeer herding area.69 This was a principle also in-
herent in the former reindeer husbandry legislation – and was applied for the first 
time in the Selbu case.70
The case regarded reindeer herding on private lands for two reindeer herding 
districts within the Selbu Municipality in the south-eastern part of the herding 
area. The dispute regarded certain outlying fields of some 400 km2. The Supreme 
Court held that the land use was of such character as to establish a reindeer herd-
ing right on the basis of immemorial usage.71
As a point of departure the Court stated that specific regard must be taken of 
reindeer husbandry as a part of a traditional culture separate from the Norwegian. 
The Court stated that:
Since our case regards pasture rights concerning reindeer, the specific conditions 
within this livelihood must be considered … The conditions must be adjusted to the 
land uses of the area by the Sámi and the reindeer. Regard must also be taken of the 
nomadic lifestyle of the Sámi. Circumstances that have been significant for other 
grazing animals cannot without consideration be transferred to reindeer husbandry. 
These circumstances must be a part of the overall assessment.72
With this interpretive principle as a backdrop, the Court emphasized in particular 
the need for vast pasturage and that the use may vary from year to year in correla-
tion with weather and wind conditions and the nature of the reindeer. Therefore, it 
could not be required that the reindeer have pasturage in a specific area each year. 
This, together with the nomadic lifestyle, meant that pauses in the land use should 
not cause a stop in the acquisition, even if the lapse were lengthy.73
Although the Court considered historical material, including testimonies, as 
far back as the 15th century, the 20 th century seemed to be the most crucial in the 
assessment. The Court concluded that even if the land use should not be sufficient 
up to the late 1800s, given the conditions for immemorial usage, the Sámi had in 
any case established pasture rights when their land use in the 1900s was taken 
into account.74 Regarding the character of the use, the Court accepted a lower in-
69. The provision explicitly states that within the Sámi reindeer herding area “there is a right to 
pasture…” See the Norwegian RHA, s. 4 para. 2. See also Ot.prp. nr. 28 (1994–95) pp. 30–31, 39.
70. The land owners had to prove with the degree of probability that the land use did not have the 
necessary scope and intensity to be regarded as a lawful reindeer pasture area, see the case at 
p. 788.
71. Rt. 2001 s. 769 at p. 814.
72. Ibid., p. 789.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 814.
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tensity of use in the outer zone on the basis of the topography of the land and the 
nature of the reindeer.75 Likewise a more lenient attitude was applied towards the 
criterion on continuous use for reindeer husbandry, following from the Court’s 
general remarks cited above.
The Supreme Court also maintained the condition on good faith in favor of 
the reindeer herders. The Court reasoned that the Sámi at the time had limited 
knowledge of Norwegian written language vis-a-vis various documents from au-
thorities, in particular those related to land uses in the 20th century.76 Moreover 
all reindeer herders in the two districts were not required to have been in good 
faith for the entire time period.
3.2.3 The Svartskogen case – Sámi ownership
The matter in the Svartskogen case77 concerned intensive and diversified us-
age, mainly through farming, hunting and fishing by a local community (with a 
Sámi majority) in northern Norway (Kåfjord Municipality). The dispute regarded 
whether the State or the local Sámi was the rightful owner of a land area of 116 
km2, including an area called “Svartskogen.” This case was also decided by appli-
cation of national property law, although the Sámi invoked the same treaty-based 
articles as in the Selbu case.78 In this case prescription or immemorial usage was 
claimed, but since the land use was lengthy the Supreme Court commenced with 
an assessment vis-à-vis immemorial usage.79
In contrast to the Selbu case, the land use as such was not seen as explicitly 
distinct for the Sámi. Instead a central assessment regarded whether the land 
use had been sufficiently intensive given the collective use. The Supreme Court 
concluded that:
… the land use has had a varied form given what has been a natural utilisation in the 
different periods. In a nutshell, the land use is characterised by continuity, and has 
been all-embracing and intensive as well as flexible. The conditions regarding the 
scope and length of the land use for establishment of ownership are maintained.80
75. Ibid., pp. 815–816. The Court maintained that such areas could not be assessed in isolation.
76. Ibid., pp. 813–814.
77. Rt. 2001 s. 1229. The decision of the Court was unanimous (5 judges).
78. Ibid., p. 1252. The Court stated, though, that its conclusion was well in line with the protec-
tion allowed by Article 14 of the ILO Convention No. 169.
79. Ibid., p. 1241. The Supreme Court never assessed the land use based on the conditions of 
prescription.
80. Ibid., p. 1244.
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When it comes to the time period the Court seems to accept some 100 years as the 
time criterion. The Court says that this claim concerned land uses for over a hun-
dred years, and further that it was not necessary to assess the land use before 1879 
(due to land partition).81 The strongest reason seems to have been the significant 
increase in the population in the late 1800s, which meant that the need to use the 
Svartskogen area would have amplified. Given the communal use of Svartskogen, 
the intensity criterion was mitigated.82 The Court emphasized that not all in the 
community had used the area regularly and intensively, but the local view still was 
that no person held a stronger right than any other.83 In this the Court accepted 
that a communal use of this kind may give rise to strong rights.
Svartskogen was also clearly demarcated by its topography, and there had never 
been disputes over utilization with neighboring communities. This seems to have 
been important for the assessment of how exclusive the usage had been, which typi-
cally is a rather strict requirement. The issue of exclusiveness is not explicit in the 
Court’s reasoning, but along with the natural topography, the Court’s statement 
that the Sámi had used Svartskogen “in all possible ways” is important.84 Hence, 
to some extent the exclusivity criterion seems to have been modified.
The criterion on exclusive use also has links to the State’s ways of gaining au-
thority over the area, which coincides with the good faith required. The particu-
larity of the Svartskogen case must in any event be deemed to be the assessment 
of the condition for good faith. There was evidence that the State at times tried to 
regulate and seize the land, but for the most part the State did not pursue those 
efforts. So, after a complex overall assessment, the Court maintained the view of 
the community that they had rights to use the area as property owners.85
3.3 Immemorial prescription in Swedish law
3.3.1 The doctrine of immemorial prescription
Immemorial prescription in Swedish law will likewise be studied with regard to 
legal literature. It is the doctrine as such that is examined in this section, where-
as the following section briefly analyses the only precedent case on immemorial 
prescription, the Taxed Mountains case, which concerned both ownership and 
81. Ibid., p. 1241.
82. Compare with Eriksen, op. cit., p. 332.
83. Rt. 2001 s. 1229 at p. 1244. 
84. Ibid., p. 1244. The same opinion in Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 340–343. This criterion seems to have 
been concealed behind other issues.
85. Rt. 2001 s. 1229 at pp. 1244–1252. See also Eriksen, op. cit., pp. 346–347.
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reindeer husbandry. Both sections are relevant for understanding Sámi territorial 
rights in Finnish law.
Lengthy possession and use can establish rights through immemorial prescrip-
tion, and rights may concern either ownership or limited rights. Immemorial pre-
scription has been codified since medieval times and continued on into the Real 
Property Code of 1734. In the 1970s, with the enactment of the new Real Property 
Code, the doctrine was brought to an end. Via transitional rules, already existing 
rights based upon immemorial prescription continue to be lawful.86
In Sweden, prescription has long been seen as an outdated doctrine with lit-
tle practical use. As a consequence very little is written on the doctrine in recent 
times.87 There are a few cases from the 19th century and the first half of 20th century, 
but none concern Sámi territorial rights.88 Only in recent years has the doctrine 
been revived through Sámi legal matters brought to courts.
Early preparatory works to the reindeer husbandry legislation briefly acknowl-
edge that reindeer herding rights rest in immemorial prescription. Since 1993, 
through an amendment, the Reindeer Husbandry Act states in section 1 paragraph 
2 that the reindeer herding right “is held by the Sámi people and is founded on 
immemorial prescription.” 89 According to the preparatory work to the present 
Reindeer Husbandry Act, matters concerning the existence of reindeer herding 
rights shall be tried by the court “on the basis of such evidence that according to 
general legislation, is required for recognition of immemorial prescription.” 90 The 
problem is that no one seems to know what that means. The fact that the doctrine 
has rarely been used in modern times makes it problematic to interpret with its 
86. Act (1970:995) on Promulgation of the New Real Property Code, s. 6. Present hunting and 
fishing legislation also acknowledges rights based upon immemorial prescription.
87. Maria Ågren has done an important historical study of the doctrine’s application in the 17th 
century: M. Ågren, Att hävda sin rätt (Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, Stockholm, 
1997). The author’s doctoral thesis contains an examination of the doctrine and its appli-
cation, in part with the support of Ågren’s work, see Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 264–285. 
Bertil Bengtsson has also written on the doctrine in connection with reindeer husbandry, see 
Bengtsson, op. cit., pp. 79–89. For older legal literature see primarily Ö. Undén, Svensk sakrätt 
II. Fast egendom (Gleerup Bokförlag, Lund, 1965); G. Hafström, Den svenska fastighetsrättens 
historia (Juridiska föreningen, Lund 1969).
88. For reference of cases see Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 270–271.
89. The main inspiration behind this amendment was the Supreme Court’s finding in the Taxed 
Mountains case, where the Court held that the reindeer herding right was based upon im-
memorial prescription and, therefore, not dependent upon a statute for its existence. See 
further next section. The wording of this provision is similar to language in the Norwegian 
Reindeer Husbandry Act, where it refers to immemorial usage as the basis for the reindeer 
herding right. See the Norwegian RHA s. 4 para. 1.
90. Prop. 1971:51 p. 158 that refers to Prop. 1928:43 p. 71.
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vague conditions. What is clear, though, is that the onus of proof rests on the Sámi 
claiming immemorial prescription.91
The provision in the old Real Property Code from 1734 reads:
It is immemorial prescription where someone has possessed, used and utilised real 
property or a right for such a long time undisputed and unhindered, that no one 
remembers or on good authority knows how his ancestors or acquirers came to be.92
Of importance in relation to the land use is the provision’s emphasis on both pos-
session and the usage. In relation to immemorial usage in Norwegian law, only 
the use is stressed as a relevant condition. The provision’s wording is not a play 
on words, as the concept of possession is more evident in relation to prescription 
in general.93 This suggests a stricter assessment of the character of the land use, 
with an emphasis also on the exercise of authority over the area, which should 
have relevance for the assessment of how intensive the land use has been. The 
concept of possession is difficult to apply and also rather unclear in Swedish law.94 
For instance, in unsettled and outlying areas, where reindeer husbandry mainly 
is carried out, an efficient control is more or less impossible. For claims on own-
ership or exclusive limited rights, such as an exclusive hunting right, the degree 
of control exercised is essential, as for immemorial usage, and this is typically a 
strict condition.
Furthermore, to establish rights it is important that the possession and use has 
been continuous. How long an intermission may be acceptable without losing the 
prescription is unclear and has never been tried before a court.95 The old provision 
also calls for land use and possession that has been “undisputed and unhindered” 
(okvald och ohindrat), which, in modern Swedish, means that the right should not 
be dubious or disputed by anyone.96 What it means in a given situation is unclear, 
but a prescriptive use may be “broken” through the action of others, primarily the 
property owner or others using the area.97
Regarding the time period, a long established use of an area is required, roughly 
some 90 years total (two generations back). The time period required for establish-
91. Old Real Property Code, chapter 15 s. 4. See also Bengtsson, op. cit., p. 81.
92. Old Real Property Code, chapter 15 s. 1.
93. Compare with Norwegian literature, Brækhus and Hærem, op. cit., pp. 579–580.
94. Bengtsson acknowledges the importance of possession in immemorial prescription, but ques-
tions its relevance for Sámi territorial rights. He suggests that emphasis be laid on the usage 
instead, Bengtsson, op. cit., pp. 83–84. See also Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 275–277.
95. Thirty years has been discussed. See Bengtsson, op. cit., pp. 85–86; SOU 2006:14, pp. 393–394.
96. Allard (2010), op. cit., pp. 25–26.
97. SOU 2006:14, pp. 394–395; Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 278–279.
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ing rights has never been fixed, and the suggestion of 90 years has its origin in legal 
literature, based on the idea that with a much longer time span memory is lost.98
The above-mentioned conditions are central for establishing immemorial pre-
scription, and all conditions are problematic in some way when applied to tradi-
tional Sámi land usage, particularly with regard to reindeer husbandry.99 A recent 
government commission concluded that, because of cultural differences in land 
use between the Sámi and the Swedish population, there are in principle two sepa-
rate doctrines. The conditions for “normal” immemorial prescription need careful 
consideration before they can be applied.100
3.3.2 The Taxed Mountains case – potential Sámi ownership and the rein-
deer herding right
The Sámi have lost several cases regarding reindeer herding rights on private lands, 
and none of them has been tried by the Supreme Court. Thus the Taxed Mountains 
case101 is the only preceding case in Sweden on immemorial prescription and Sámi 
territorial rights. The case included claims on ownership and reindeer herding 
rights, and its significance relates to the clarification of the legal nature of Sámi 
reindeer herding rights in particular.
The Taxed Mountains case is huge and complex, and it is still the largest in 
Swedish case history.102 It commenced with a few Sámi villages suing the State in 
the mid-1960s claiming ownership rights, or at least stronger rights than expressed 
in the reindeer husbandry legislation. The Sámi also wished to have a declaration 
that their rights existed on the basis of civil law, irrespective of legislation. Their 
claims rested primarily on occupation and immemorial usage. The disputed area 
concerned an area known as the taxed mountains (due to administrative pro-
ceedings in the 1840s involving taxation and land partitioning) in the County of 
Jämtland, quite close to the Norwegian border.
After extensive examination of historical material, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the State was the owner of the area, ultimate due to a decree of 1683. The Sámi land 
98. Ö. Undén, Svensk sakrätt II. Fast egendom (Gleerup Bokförlag, Lund, 1965) p. 144.
99. There are a few more prerequisites inherent in immemorial prescription that are not addressed 
here. See further Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 271–282; Bengtsson, op. cit., pp. 79–87.
100. SOU 2006:14 pp. 378, 386 and 388. This commission investigated the boundaries of reindeer 
herding rights and to some extent analysed the doctrine of immemorial prescription.
101. NJA 1981 s. 1. In relevant aspects here, the decision was unanimous (6 judges).
102. See further in e.g. B. Bengtsson, The legal status of rights to resources in Swedish Lapland (in: 
Berge and Stenseth (eds.), Law and the governance of renewable resources, ICS Press, Oakland, 
1998) pp. 225–227; Allard (2006), op. cit., pp. 258–262. It should be noted that Bengtsson was 
one of the judges in the case.
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use was not sufficiently intense or exclusive in character to establish ownership.103 
Nevertheless, the Court accepted the idea that the Sámi through reindeer herding, 
hunting and fishing may acquire ownership through immemorial prescription 
regardless of the extent to which they cultivated land or settled permanently.104 As 
such, this is an important statement of principle compared to the prevailing view.
Despite the obvious defeat for the Sámi, the Supreme Court did make some 
principally important statements concerning the reindeer herding right. The Court 
held that the rights ultimately rested on immemorial prescription, clarifying that 
the legislation as such did not create the rights. In addition, the Court held that the 
reindeer herding right in principle was fully regulated in the first statute from 1886 
and that the content of the reindeer herding right had been transferred on into the 
1971 Act. Since reindeer herding rights were based upon civil law, the Court stated 
that they are protected by the Constitution in the same way as ownership; takings 
and other infringements entitle compensation. In sum, the Court maintained that 
the reindeer herding right, as codified into legislation, is a strong usufruct right.
3.4 Immemorial prescription in Finnish law
In Finnish law much is unclear when it comes to Sámi territorial rights.105 One 
problem is the absence of cases that deal with reindeer husbandry and immemo-
rial prescription.106 Another is the scarcity of modern literature analysing the legal 
situation of the Sámi concerning the use of land and natural resources.107
As mentioned briefly above, Finnish reindeer husbandry legislation differs from 
its Swedish and Norwegian counterparts. The legislation is silent about a Sámi 
reindeer herding right and this activity does not constitute an exclusive livelihood 
103. NJA 1981 s. 1 at p. 229. The burden of proof in this case was shared. The majority of the evi-
dence was comprised of public administrative documents of various kinds, including docu-
ments and decisions by the Swedish King.
104. Ibid., p. 190.
105. H. J. Hyvärinen, The legal status of rights to resources in Finnish Lapland (in: Berge and Stenseth 
(eds.), Law and the governance of renewable resources, ICS Press, Oakland, 1998) p. 240.
106. The few cases relating to reindeer husbandry are instead articulated through the provisions in 
legislation, and legal argumentation has not progressed into issues on immemorial prescription.
107. For a condensed summary see Hyvärinen (1998), op. cit., and on regulation of Sámi cul-
ture and livelihood see H. J. Hyvärinen, Saamelaisten kulttuurin ja elinkeinojen sääntely (in: 
K. T. Kokko (ed.) Kysymyksiä saamelaisten oikeusasemasta, Lapin yliopiston oikeustieteel-
lisiä julkaisuja, Rovaniemi, 2010). For legal historical studies see J. Joona, Entisiin Tornion ja 
Kemin Lapinmaihin kuuluneiden alueiden maa- ja vesioikeuksista (NIEM, Rovaniemi, 2006); 
Korpijaakko-Labba (1994), op. cit.; K. Korpijaakko-Labba, The history of rights to resources in 
Swedish and Finnish Lapland (in: Berge and Stenseth (eds.), Law and the governance of renew-
able resources, ICS Press, Oakland, 1998).
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for the Finnish Sámi. This complicates the picture when it comes to interpreta-
tion and application of national as well as international law.108 The parliamentary 
constitutional committee has mentioned on several occasions the need to prop-
erly investigate the unique cultural and legal status of Sámi reindeer herders.109 It 
should be noted that there have been attempts to settle the issue of Sámi territorial 
rights generally by legislative means, in particular for an administrative area called 
“the Sámi homeland” in northernmost Finland, but the proposals never reached 
the parliament for decision.110
All the same, Sámi territorial rights in Finland should closely resemble the 
Swedish legal situation with regard to the basic principles.111 An important factor 
in understanding the reindeer herding right in Finnish law is the close histori-
cal connection between Sweden and Finland. Since Finland once was part of the 
Kingdom of Sweden for over 650 years, with the same public administration, law 
and judiciary system, Sámi territorial rights can be expected to contain many 
similarities. Also, after 1809 to a large extent, Swedish law formed the basis of the 
legal system in Finland.112
Hence Sweden and Finland have historically had the same legal structure and 
legislation, in particular the old Real Property Code of 1734 with the provision 
on immemorial prescription in chapter 15 section 1. This provision was formally 
applicable in Finland as late as 1996. With the enactment of the new Real Property 
Code in January 1, 1997 the old Swedish Code was repelled.113 The transitional 
provisions of the new Code state that the possibility to claim immemorial pre-
scription continues.114
The preparatory work for the present Reindeer Husbandry Act briefly mentions, 
in relation to the right to herd reindeer, that the reindeer herders “since olden times 
have had this right and the intention is that they shall have it also in the future.” 115 
The Sámi is not mentioned specifically, but it must mean that rights since olden 
times apply also to reindeer herding Sámi. This understanding is supported by the 
108. See also Nordisk samekonvensjon, op. cit., pp. 112–113.
109. See e.g. GrUU 29/2004 rd. pp. 2–4.
110. Hyvärinen (1998), op. cit. p. 237.
111. The same opinion in Joona, op. cit., pp. 402–403.
112. T. Modeen, Finlands och Sveriges rätt (Åbo akademis förlag, Åbo, 1989) pp. 1–5, 11–12; A. 
Aarnio Introduction (in: J. Pöyhönen (ed.) An Introduction to Finnish Law, Kauppakaari, 
Helsinki, 2002) pp. 2–4.
113. Real Property Code 12.4.1995/540.
114. Act on Promulgation of the Real Property Code 12.4.1995/541, s. 18.
115. RP 244/1989 p. 6.
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preparatory works for the former reindeer husbandry legislation of 1932 and 1948, 
which briefly refer to the Sámi right as founded on “immemorial prescription.”116
Nevertheless, some question marks remain. Heikki Hyvärinen has argued that 
although the preparatory work from 1929, which resulted in the first reindeer 
herding legislation of 1932, referred to immemorial prescription as the legal basis 
for Sámi reindeer husbandry, the committee omitted the Sámi as rights-holders 
when drafting the legal text. Nor did the legal text mention anything about a 
reindeer herding right. The committee argued that the legislator had complete 
autonomy in the matter.117 Up until the 1970s the reindeer herding right was still 
understood to be based on immemorial prescription and thus characterised as a 
civil right in preparatory works. Thereafter the right is seen as a public right for 
all reindeer owners.118
This erosion of the reindeer herding right has occurred mainly through state-
ments in preparatory works and by omitting the right-holders and the content of 
the right in legislation. If ever tried in a court on the basis of immemorial prescrip-
tion, it is highly doubtful the court would find the civil right non-existent due to 
such reasons. The origin of the reindeer herding right in immemorial prescription 
means per se that it is a right not dependent upon statutory recognition for its ex-
istence.119 As long as the State has not clearly abolished the right by parliamentary 
legislation, which should give a right to compensation, the right should exist.120
Sámi ownership or reindeer herding rights are to be tried on the basis of the 
Swedish Real Property Code of 1734 and the provision on immemorial prescrip-
tion. The interpretation and understanding of immemorial prescription ought to 
be essentially the same as in Swedish law. In relevant aspects the Taxed Mountains 
case should therefore be understood as a precedent case.
116. Komiteanmietintö 1942:8 p. 4; Komiteanmietintö 1929:8 pp. 50–51. Finnish reindeer herders 
may have established rights due to long-term possession and use based upon immemorial 
prescription as well. Compare e.g. with historical cases dealing with fishing rights based on 
immemorial prescription and taxation duties in faraway lakes of Finnish settlers in Joona, 
op. cit., p. 396.
117. Hyvärinen (2010), op. cit., pp. 129–131.
118. Ibid., pp. 131–132.
119. NJA 1981 s. 1. Compare Jebens, op. cit., p. 26. The content of the reindeer herding right prob-
ably includes hunting and fishing rights similar to the corresponding rights in Norway and 
Sweden.
120. Same opinion in Hyvärinen (1998), op. cit. p. 237.
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4 Conclusion
This article analyses the general principles underpinning the recognition of Sámi 
territorial rights, and particular differences in law in three Scandinavian countries. 
As stated initially, rather indistinct differences may work in advance for the recog-
nition of Sámi territorial rights within the Norwegian legal system, as compared 
to the prescription-based doctrine in Sweden and Finland. Chiefly two features 
associated with immemorial usage stand out. These have been highlighted already 
in relation to the Norwegian prescriptive rules, and are reiterated here.
First, the different facts and criteria are not static when one is to assess whether 
a condition in immemorial usage is met. The conditions are internally relative. The 
court is therefore called to make an overall assessment of all facts taken together. 
Although most of the conditions inherent in immemorial usage are more lenient 
than prescription in Norwegian law, the situation is usually corrected by the length 
of land usage. This feature of immemorial usage is highly relevant for traditional 
Sámi land use, which typically is lengthy but is carried out over large areas with a 
less intensive character compared to the standard for cultivation. Consequently, 
if the land use through reindeer herding, hunting and fishing, etc., has been less 
intensive and continuous it may very well be deemed sufficient if the time involved 
is long-standing.
Second, immemorial usage is an unwritten doctrine, and as such its conditions 
may more easily be modified and adapted to specific circumstances, such as ac-
counting for cultural differences between Sámi and Norwegians. Such adjustments 
must be characterized as judge-made law. This denotes a classical tension between 
the substantive law and legal positivism on the one hand, and a pragmatically-
oriented judiciary on the other.121 Norwegian law has features from both systems 
and has been characterized as a hybrid between Anglo-American law and the 
European civil law traditions.122 As an observation, Norwegian property law has 
a relatively larger portion of unwritten law than Swedish and Finnish laws, where 
legal positivism also must be said to have a stronger grip.
Of importance for my argument here is that the unwritten conditions for ac-
quiring rights under immemorial usage, along with the strong position of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court as an autonomous, law-making legal institution,123 has 
progressed into culturally significant adjustments of the doctrine. This is particu-
larly evident in the Selbu case, where the livelihood of the reindeer herders and the 
121. Compare Eriksen, op. cit., p. 348.
122. J. Ø. Sunde, Speculum legale – rettsspegelen (Fagbokforlaget, Bergen 2005) pp. 325–326; 
Eriksen, op. cit., p. 349.
123. Ibid., p. 350.
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nature of the reindeer were regarded as relevant, but also in the Svartskogen case, 
in the assessment of the condition of good faith. With a freer assessment follows 
improved possibilities for a court to elevate “societal influences” implicitly within 
its reasoning, such as an emphasis on developments within the indigenous people’s 
law. Even though the two Norwegian cases were solved by application of domestic 
law, one cannot disregard the possibility that such influences may have affected 
the cultural adjustments made.
In contrast, the assessment of facts and conditions for immemorial prescription 
adheres first of all to the wording of the provision in the old Real Property Code – 
following the principle of the primacy of written law. The emphasis on possession, 
for instance, presupposes stricter requirements for the actual land use, particularly 
with regard to the intensity of the use. Moreover, the conditions are not internally 
relative in the same way, even if one may assume that there might be some room 
for a court to assess different aspects of the actual land use. At the same time we 
should remember that the conditions for immemorial prescription are indistinct, 
largely because of the doctrine’s long-term neglect.
To sum up this analysis, I can only conclude that these two main features of 
immemorial usage – the conditions’ relativeness and the doctrine’s unwritten 
character – even though not immediately obvious, must have relevance in indi-
vidual cases where Sámi territorial rights are in dispute. They work in tandem 
to accommodate claims for Sámi territorial rights in Norwegian law. They may 
therefore, to a certain degree, facilitate recognition of Sámi rights in Norway com-
pared to Sweden and Finland. This accommodation could well be illustrated with 
the expression “where there is a will, there is a way,” and for immemorial usage 
this road is smooth. Whether Swedish and Finnish Supreme Courts take the same 
path remains to be seen, but there is clearly a need to follow the Norwegian lead.
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Аннотация
Право на землю является одним из важнейших как для саамского, так и для 
других коренных народов мира. Земля – это основа, на которой зиждется вся 
культура саами, от земли зависит ее выживание. В статье автор сравнивает 
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права на собственность в Норвегии, Швеции и Финляндии, как сформули-
рованы и реализуются права на земельные и природные ресурсы саамского 
народа в законодательстве эти стран. Право на землю основано на старых 
доктринах: «использование с незапамятных времен» в Норвегии и «древний 
обычай или в силу данности» в Швеции и Финляндии. Хотя доктрины вообще 
расцениваются как равноценные, в статье обсуждается несколько сущест-
венных различий. Автор анализирует, противопоставляет и обсуждает ряд 
основных принципов, подкрепляющие обе доктрины, с особым упором на 
право по северному оленеводству.
Ключевые слова: права саами, территориальные права, использование с 
незапамятных времен, древний обычай или данность, законодательство Нор-
вегии, Швеции и Финляндии, оленеводство.
